Simplified solutions for two-person percentile games by Kelleher, G. J. & Walsh, J. E.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19710016636 2020-03-11T20:10:30+00:00Z
1 
i
SIMPLIFIED SOLUTIONS FOR TWO F,,ERSON Pr =► GENTILE GAMES
by
John E. Walsh and Grace „J. Kelleher
Y
(	 Technical Report No. 94
Department of Statistics ON,R Contract
_	 Rpnrnrhirtirsn to whole r in n rt is perm	
^1l
11	
^ _e o	 . ,_e	 fitted
For any purpose of ti^8 United States Government
This document has been approved for public release
and sale; its distributidn is unlimited.
J
DEPARTMENT-10F STATISTICS
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas 75222
VOIJ
H d D/,	
o	 ^i 197 1, tS'T^	
'l
ei
0
.^	 (AC4m5a9CsfK
r 	 (^t( 4DE
 
-
r Lq
(NASA CR OR ►MX ®R Aid NUMBER)
r
SIMPLIFIED SOLUTIONS FOR TWO-PERSON PERCENTILE GAMES
by
John E. Walsh and Grace J. Kelleher
`
	
	 Technical Report No. 94
Department of Statistics ONR Contract
,t
January 4, 1971
Research sponsored by the Office of Naval Research
Contract N00014-66-A-0515
Project NR 042-260
Reproduction in whole ' or in part is permitted
for eny purpose of the United States Government.
This document has been approved for public release
and sale; its distribution is unlimited.
t
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS
Southern Methodist University
Y
i
SIMPLIFIED SOLUT ONS FOR 'IWO-PERSON PERCENTILE GAMF;S*
John E. Walsh
	 Grace J. Kelleher
Southern Methodist University**
	 University of Texas at Arl:.ngtori
ABSTRACT
Consider solution of a two-person game in which the players use
percentile criteria. For player i, the stepwise pr: ycedure is to mark
positions of the game outcomes (pairs of payoffs, one to each player) in
his payoff matrix according to decreasing desirability level (i = 1,2).
To be determined is the smallest marked set such that, for percentile
100cxi
 used by player i, an outcome of this set can be assured with prob-
ability at least cyi . Also, an optimum mixed strategy is to be determined
(for accomplishing this assurance). In general, the probability with
which a marked set can be assured is evaluated by solo*ion of a special-
ized zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. However, easily evalu-
ated upper and lower bounds for this probability can be obtained from the
matrix locations of the markings. Use of these bounds r.-an substantially
reduce the effort in the stepwise solution of a game. Moreover, equality
of the bounds can occur. Then, the probability is determined without
solution of a zero-sum game, and a corresponding optimum strategy is
readily identified. The probability value is approximately determined
when the bounds are nearly equal, and an approximately optimum strategy
is easily identified. Indications are that many percentile games can be
solved, exactly or approximately, by this simplified method.
*Part of the results given here were independently discovered by fir.
Robert E. Hiller of the Operations Analysis Office, Pacific Air Forces,
Hawaii.
**Research partially supported by Mobil Research and Development corpora-
tion. Also associated with ONR Contract N00014-68-A-0515 and NASA Grant
NGR 44-007-028.
INTRODWTION AND SOME RESULTS
Considered is the case of two players with finite numbers of strat-
egies, where each player selects his strategy separately and independently
of the strategy choice by the other player. Mixed strategies are used.
That is, a player assigns probabilities to his strategies (sum to unity,
with a unit probability possible) and randomly selects the strategy used
according to these probabilities.
The possible game outcomes are the pairs of payoffs, one to each
player, that occur for the possible combinations of strategy selection
by the two players. The payoffs can be of a very general nature but are
such that the outcomes can be ranked according to desirability level
separately by each player. Use of a matrix form is convenient for con-
sidering the possible payoffs to a player, where rows rep-esent his strat-
egies and columns represent the other player's strategies.
For percentile game theory, player i specifies a probability cxi which
represents the assurance with which he wants to obtain an outcome with
reasonably high desirability (i = 1 0,2). A largest level of desirability
occurs among the outcomes such that player i can assure, with probability
at least ai , that an outcome having at least this desirability level occurs.
The symbol 0  designates the outcome(s) having this largest desirability
level.
Given cxi , a game solution for player i consists in determining Oi
and an optimum strategy for the combination 
^,i and Oi . This determination
can be made by a stepwise procedure in which, for player i, positions of
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oui_%,onws are marked in his payoff matrix according to decreasing desi..-
ability level (outcomes with the same level are marked simultaneously).
0  is determined as the outcome(s) having the smallest desirability level
in the smallest set of marked outcomes that player i can assure with
probability at least cri . In general, the probability with which a stated
marked set of outcomes can be assured is evaluated as the value of a
zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. The payoff matri n for player
i in this game has ones at the marked positions and zeroes at the un-
marked positions. An optimum strategy for player i in the zero-sum game
corresponding to the smallest marked set containing 0  is an optimum
strategy for the combination of  and Oi . Ref. 1 contains a detailed state-
ment of this general method for solution of two-person percentile games.
A couple of one-sided bounds on the probability with which a marked
set can be assured (one bound used for on A 1/2, the other for 01 > 1/2)
are given in ref. 1. These bounds are helpful in reducing the effort
needed for solving a game.
This paper develops a class of upper and lower bounds such that both
an upper and lover bound is available for the probability with which a
marked set can be assured by player i (a lower bound may have the trivial
value zero, or an upper bound the trivial value vini ty , in some cases) .
Equality of the upper and lower bounds occurs in a number of cases, with
the probability being directly determined without solution of a zero-sum
game. At least approximate equality of upper and lower bounds occurs in
many cases. Then the probability with which a marked set can be assured
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is at least approximately determined without solution of a zero-sum gaine.
Moreover, when equality of bound3 occurs, an optimum (mixed) strategy for
accomplishing this probability is readily determined. Also, an approxi-
mately optimum (mixed) strategy is easily determined when the bounds are
approximately equal. These results, which apply to any marked set in the
payoff matrix for player i., can be exceedingly helpful in reducingnq the
Effort for solving a game.
Specifically, for a given marked set, suppose that at least M marks
in every column ark obtainable from R rows, and that at least U unmarked
positions in every raw are obtainable from C columns. Then, player i can
assure an outcome of the marked set with probability at least M/R and at
most 1 - U/C. If R rows and t1 columns with these properties satisfy
M/R = 1 - U/C,
then an optimum mixed strategy for player i is to choose one of the:. , R
rows with probability 1/R for each row (and probability zero for the other
rows). If M/R approximately equals 1 - U/C, this mixed strategy is
approximately optimum and the assurance probability with this strategy is
at least M/R.
Use of these results to obtain simplified solutions for two-person
percentile games is considered in the next section. An example of deter-
mination of upper and lower bounds on assurance probabilities is given in
the next to last section. The final section contains the basic theorems
and their verification.
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SIMPLIFIED SOLUTION METHOD
The same solution method applies to each player and is stated for
player i. A preferred assurance probability nyi , 0 < on s 1, is specified
by player i. First, the solution method is stated for this given value
of ari . Then, advantages of making small changes in preferred values for
oti are discussed.
The method is stated in terms of a marking of outcome positions in
the payoff matrix for player i. The r rows of this matrix correspond to
the r strategies for player i, and the c columns are the strategies for
the other player (r, c Z 2) .
As the initial step, mark the position(s) in the payoff n$trix for
player i of the outcome(s) with the highest level of desirability to
player i. Determine the smallest value of 1 - U/C for this marking, where
U and C arP such that at least U unmarked positions in every row are
obtainable from C columns.
Next, also mark the position(s) of the outcome(s) with the next to
highest desirability level and determine the smallest value of 1 - U/C
for the overall marking. Continue this marking, according to decreasing
desirability level, until the first time that 01  is at most equal to the
smallest value of 1 - U/C (for the overall marking). Also determine the
largest value of M/R for this marking, where M and R are such that at
least M marks in every column are obtainable from R rows. If
largest M/R S o!i s smallest (l - U/C)
	
(1)
•	 and the largest M/R equals, or approximately equals, the smallest (1 - U/C),
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a usable solution is obtained (exact or approximate) . Then, 0 1
 is
determined as the outcome (s) with smallest desirability level in this
marked set.
	 An optimum (or approximately optimum) strategy consists of
randomly selecting one of the R rows for which largest M/R. occurs so
- that iv.ch row has probability 1/11 of being chosen.
i1	 k I f (1) holds but	 e bounds are	 o th	 d	 n t a pproximately equal, continue
the marking until (1) holds wi'h the bounds equal or approximately equal,
or until a 
	 is at most equal to the largest M/R.
	 When tlx: situation is
that (1) holds with the bounds equal or nearly equal, a usable solution
is obtained (ds described in the preceding paragraph) .
	 However, this
solution can be approximate even when the bounds are equal, since the
marked set may not Ix,
 the smallest set that can be assured with probability
at least ai .	 This possible difference in set size is usually unimportanta
but the method of ref. 1 could be used to determine whether a smaller set
satisfies the requirements.
Finally, suppose that a marking has been reached (without first
C--raining a usable solution) where a i is at most equal to the largest
M/R.	 Then, remove the mark (s) for the outcome (s) with lowest desirability
4
' level among the outcomes Coat have received marks. 	 Then, by the following
procedure, determine whether some one of the remaining marked outcomes can
be assured with probability at least ai .	 The procedure (used in ref. 1)
is to replace every marked position in the matrix of player i by unity
a-d all other positions by zero.	 The resulting matrix of ones and zeroes
- is considered to be the payoff matrix to player i for a zero-sum game with
an expected-value basis, and is solved for the value of the game to player
6
i. if the game value is less than or i , then 0  consists of the outcumc (s)
with mark(s) removed.
Otherwise, remove the mark (s) for the outcome (s) with least desirable
level among the outcomes still having marks and, using the same procedure,
determine the probability with which player i can assure a marked outcome.
If this probability is less than ori , then Oi consists of the outcrme (s)
with mark(s) removed last. If not, cont 4.nue until the first time that
some one of the remaining marked outcomes nannot be assured with proba-
bility at least ai . Then, 0  consists of the outcomes) with marks)
removed last.
For the cases sta.-! i.ng with a marking such that 01i is at most equal
to the largest M/R, the same way is used to determine an optimum mixed
strategy for player i. Mark the matrix positions of all outcomes whose
desirability level is at least that of 0  and replace marked positions by
unity and unmarked positions by zero. Treat the resulting matrix of ones
and zeroes as the payoff matrix for player i in a zero-sum game with an
expected-value basis. An optimum strategy for player i in this zero-sum
game is ai-optimum for him.
Now, consider some advantages of making small changes in the value
preferred for cxi . Markings sometimes occur such that the smallest (1 - U/C)
equals the largest M/R. If this occurs for Z value near cxi , substantial
solution effort can be avoided by letting a  equal this common value for
the bounds. At least approximate equality of the bounds can happen in
many cases, especially when r and c are of at least moderate size. Change
11
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of the value for a  to a nearby value which is between two approximately
equal bounds also can result in substantially les3 solution effort (when
approximate solutions are acceptable) . Often, use of the arithmetic
average of two approximately equal bounds provides a suitable value for
Clio
EXAMPLE OF HOUNDS DETERMINATION
To illustrate how largest M/R and smallest (1 - U/C) change as
marking continues, a payoff matrix with r • 10 and c • 8 is considered.
No ties in desirability level occur for this example +knd the numbers 1,
2,...,80 in the matrix show the locations of the most desirable outcome,
the next to most desirable outcome,...., the least desirable outcome,
respectively. The first mark occurs at the location of 3 the second at
the location of 2, etc. Thus, a total of t marks have occurred at the
time the t-th most desirable outcome is marked (t a lr ...,80) . The values
of largest M/R and of smallest (1 - U/C) are listed as functions of to
The matrix for player i, with the position numbers 1,.. . 0,80 entered,
is provided by Figure 1. The values of the largest M/R and of the smallest
(1 - U/C) are stated in pairs for t " 1, ...,80, with the largest M/R listed
first:
(0,,1/8),, for t s 1,...,7;	 (0,1/7) , for t . 8,9f
(1/7,1/7) , for t a 10,11,12; (1/6,1/6) , for t " 13,19,15;
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Fi mrc- 1, Mati--x for r}.:: Example
2 3 11 5 6 7 R	 l
38 15 77 35 11 5L 55
75 33 43 21 36 5` 67
42 2 76 28 14 70 17
31 73 48 68 6 8 44
13 20 3 37 62 30 53
78 19 29 59 66 26 7
12 61 47 71 9 49 32
41 54 18 10 34 46
22
80	 I
584 39 65 24 72
64 60 25 40 74 56 16
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(1/5,1/5) , for t = iii, 1'7;
(1/4,1/4) , for t = 20,21;
(1/4,1/3) , for t = 23;
(1/3,1/3) , for t = 25,26;
(3/8,3/7) , for t = 28,29;
(2/5,1/2) , for t = 31;
(1/2,4/7) , for t = 40,...,43;
(5/9,5/8), for t = 46;
'4/7,2/31, for t = 48;
'5/8,"/3)2 	 , for t = 51;
(2/3,5/7), for t = 53,...,56;
(3/4,4/5) , for t = 62,63;
(5/6,5/6) , for t = 68;
(1/5,1.,'4) , for t = 18,19;
(1/4,2/7) , for t = 22;
(2/7,1/3), for t - 24;
(1/3,3/8), for t = 27;
(2/5,3/7), for t = 30;
(1/2,1/2) , for t = :32,...,39;
(1/2,3/5) , for t 	 44, ,!' ;
(4/7,5/F) , for t = 47;
(3/5,2/3) , fcr t = 49,5(j;
(2/3,2/3), for t = 52;
(3/4,3/4), for t = 57,...,61;
(4/5,4/5), for t = 64,...,67;
(1,1) , for t = 69,...,80.
The uF,?er and lower bounds are seen to be near each other in almost all
cases and to be equal in some cases. Equality of bounds occurs for
probability values 1/7, 1/6, 1/5 0
 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 5/6.
THEOREMS AND PROOFS
The results stated in the previous sections are based on two theorems.
THEOREM 1. For a given set of markings of outcomes in the payoff
matrix for player i, at least M marks in every column are obtainable from
R rows and also at least U unmarked positions in every raw are obtainable
from C columns, Then, player i can assure an outcome of thu marked set
with probability at least M/R and at most 1 - U/C .
Proof. First, it is shown that a probability of at least M/R can
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be assured. Let E^ , ... ,p I- and X41 , - .. ,qe be the mixed strategies used.
Then, the probability of obtaining a marked outcome is
r
i=1piQi'
where Q  is t},e sum of the q' s for the columns that Lave marked positions
in the i-th row. The largest value of this probability that player i
can assure, by choice of pl , ..., pr , is
G =	 min (max..Qi)
Let i ( 1) , ... ,i (R) be R rows that together contain marked positions in all
columns. For any minimizing choice of the values for g l ,... ,gc , all of
Qi (1) , • ..' Qi (R) are at most G. Hence,
RG Z Qi (1) + ... + Q i (,,) ? M,
so that a probability of at least M/R carp be assured by play-r i.
Similarly, considering columns and unmarked positions, the other
player can assure an unmarked outcome with probability at least U/C. Thus,
player i can assure a marked outcome with probability at most 1 - U/C.
Theorem 2. Under the circumstances stated in Theorem 1, use of a
mixed strategy where each of the R rows is randomly selected with proba-
bility 1/R (and the other rows have zero probability) assures player i
that an outcome of the marked set occurs with probs •
 llity at least M/R.
Proof. Let pi (1) = "' = pi (R) = 1/R while the other p ' s are zero.
Then, for any given gl ,...,gc , the probability of obtaining a marked
outcome is
;i
Yt
i
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In particular, this inequality holds for any uiii:intizing set of values for
q^ ► ... ► qc
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